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Case No. 7710 
In the SupreJDe Court 
of the State of Utah 
GERTRUDE GIBBS, 
LYNN P. GIBBS and 
GAYE GIBBS SMITH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
BLUE CAB, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW 
JOHN H. SNOW 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GERTRUDE GIBBS, 
LYNN P. GIBBS and 
G.A.YE GIBBS SMITH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Case No. 7710 
vs. 
BLUE CAB, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARI~G A~D BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The respondent, Blue Cab, Inc., a corporation, peti-
tions the Court for a rehearing and reargument of the 
above entitled case upon the following grounds: 
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POINT I. 
THE COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE RECORD IN THIS 
CASE, AND HAS FAILED TO GIVE WEIGHT TO THE 
PERMISSIBLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE 
RECORD, AND ITS DECISION, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE 
RECALLED AND THE CASE REHEARD. 
POINT II. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS IN CONFUSION 
AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INTER-
SECTION LAW OF THIS STATE, AND THE DECISION, 
THEREFORE, SHOULD BE RECALLED AND THE CASE 
REHEARD. 
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the judgment 
and opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargument 
be permitted of the entire case. 
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith. 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW 
_5?('~ /v %-,_..s-
By ---u ---------3-~:h~-ii~-s~~~----------------------------
Attorneys for Respondent. 
JOHN II. SNOW hereby certifies that he is one 
of the attorneys for respondent and petitioner herein, 
and that in his opinion there is good cause to believe 
that the judgment and decision of the Court is erroneous 
and that the case should be reheard and reargued as 
prayed for in said petition. 
Dated this 9th day of December, 1952. 
--(-)~--~---£~---------
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BRIEF I~ SUPPORT OF 
PETITIO~ FOR REHEARING 
POINT I. 
THE COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE RECORD IN THIS 
CASE, AND HAS FAILED TO GIVE WEIGHT TO THE 
PERJIISSIBLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE 
RECORD, AND ITS DECISION, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE . 
RECALLED AND THE CASE REHEARD. 
There appears to be no need for a restatement of 
the facts of this case at this time inasmuch as the facts 
were throughly outlined and discussed in the original 
briefs and upon oral argument. The decision of the 
Court, however, indicates that the facts have been 
misconstrued and misapplied, and the Court has either 
ignored or minimized the effect of the logical and per-
missible inferences which should be drawn from the 
facts in order that a just and proper decision be rendered. 
The Court's decision appears to consist of a holding, 
first, that the question of whether or not the negligence 
of decedent, in not having a lighted lamp upon his 
bicycle, was contributory negligence, was a question of 
fact for the jury, and second, a holding which lumps the 
questions of other acts of negligence on the part of 
decedent and the negligence of defendant, if any, into 
one package to be submitted to and considered by the 
jury. Practically no reference is made in the decision 
to the other elements of negligence on the part of deced-
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6 
ent, and the question of negligence of defendant, if any, 
is disposed of with a passing comrnent. We shall first 
discuss the question of the unlighted bicycle. 
The bicycle of decedent had no light as required 
by law. Title 57-7-154, Utah Code Annotated, 1943; 
Section 27E2, Ogden City Ordinances. It seems to be 
conceded that the absence of the lamp was negligence, 
per se. The next question, obviously, is whether that 
negligence contributed to the cause of the accident to 
the extent that the appellants would be barred from 
recovery, as a matter of law. The Court, in the majority 
opinion, passes lightly over the problem with the com-
ment that this is a jury question, particularly because 
of the fact that "immediately prior to the time of impact 
the bicycle, and therefore the lamp, was pointed away 
from the vision of the defendant ... '' 
From this comment, it would seem that the Court 
has failed to consider the effect of the fact that decedent 
and his bicycle, in the many seconds prior to impact, 
were mere shadowy shapes in the darkness, if, in fact, 
they were visible at all. Since there was no lamp, there 
was no indication of their presence at the sidewalk line, 
the stop sign area, the curb line, or at any place in the 
northerly half of the intersection. It is just this situation 
that the statutes involved were designed to 'prevent. If 
there had been a lamp, the defendant would have been 
warned in ample time to have avoided the accident. 
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Why was the bicyele wheel turned~ It was turned to 
avoid the impact, just as the defendant's cab was turned. 
At that time, it was too late to give any warning. The 
negligence of the decedent had borne fruit. The accident 
was about to happen. That the front of the bicycle was 
then turned away fron1 the vision of the defendant is 
absolutely immaterial. The danger foreseen ·by the 
framers of the statute and ordinance had already 
materialized. 
If the decedent had had a light upon his bicycle, the 
rays from that light would have been seen either as he 
passed the sidewalk line, or passed the stop sign· area, 
and curb line, and entered into the north half of the 
intersection. Even if the bicycle had been pointed away 
from the taxicab in the area near the point of impact, 
the rays from the lamp could have been seen upon the 
darkened street, or reflected from the wet surface of 
the road. The cab driver, from the time he left Adams 
A venue, one block to the west, would 4ave had the 
opportunity to see a light at one or the other of the 
indicated points, and thus, would have had the oppor-
tunity to take steps to avoid the collision. He would not 
have been placed in the position of attempting, at the 
last moment, to avoid an accident which had been made 
inevitable by the carelessness of the bicyclist. 
The Court, however, avoids discussion of those facts 
and inferences by stating that what the bicyclist did, 
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prior to impact, is ''relegated inescapably to the realm 
of conjecture.'' By this statement, we assume .the Court 
means that it cannot be determined with certainty 
whether the decedent rode his bicycle, walked with it, 
or was standing in the middle of the intersection with it. 
Even if this be true, we fail to see how it can benefit 
appellant's case. A man who rides a bicycle without a 
light into a through street, into the path of an on-coming 
vehicle, is negligent. If he walks with his bicycle "\vithout 
a light, and into the path of a vehicle, he is negligent. 
If he stands in the middle of a street, in the path of a 
vehicle, he is negligent. That this decedent did at least 
o~e of these things is inescapable. He had to get to the 
point of impact some way. 
No matter which of the choices is utilized, the 
absence of the light is still a dominant factor in the 
happening of the accident. It would be difficult to con-
ceive of a situation better designed to illustrate the 
wisdom of the law requiring a light upon a bicycle. To 
say tha·t such ·a law is a wise law, but then to say, in 
the same breath, that a jury might reasonably find that 
the violation of the law, under these facts, is of no 
legal consequence, is to render the law meaningless. 
If this case is tried anew and submitted to the jury, 
as it necessarily would be under the Court's decision, it 
is not difficult to imagine the bewilderment of the mem-
bers of the jury when they are told that the conduct of 
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9 
the decedent was negligent and a Yiolation of the law, 
on the one hand, but that, on the other hand, maybe it 
didn't n1ake any difference, after all. 
A fair appraisal of the Court's holding on the 
question of the unlighted bicycle leads unavoidably to 
the conclusion that the decision gives undue emphasis 
to the fact that the bicycle ''Tas turned away from the 
cab driver just before impact, and fails to consider the 
effect of the absence of the light prior to that time, 
and fails to consider the effect and meaning of the 
statutory enactments upon this subject. 
The majority opinion of the Court, it seems to us, 
has failed to give adequate consideration to another 
factor in this case. There seems to be no escape from the 
conclusion that the decedent was contributorily negligent 
by placing himself in the intersection at the time and in 
the manner which he did in this case. We do not urge, 
as indicated by the Court, that" anyone killed or injured 
in an intersection ... of necessity must have been guilty 
of some carelessness contributing to the mishap." How-
ever, no adequate answer has yet been heard to the 
question posed by Counsel upon oral argument of this 
case to the effect that, if decedent was acting with due 
care, how could he have arrived at the center of this 
intersection in the face of the on-coming taxicab~ 
The Court recognizes that there was clear visibility 
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for a block from the scene of the accident, as found by 
the trial court after inspection of the scene. The Court, 
however, atternpts to minimize the effect of the personal 
inspection by stating that it was made ''on an ordinary 
day when factors of darkness, wetness, rain, mist, etc. 
were absent.'' What possible difference the absence of 
these factors could mean to this case is nowhere made 
clear. If anything, the presence of these factors at the 
time of the accident makes it even more clear that deced-
ent was guilty of negligence. This is so because the 
doctrine of the reasonable man requires the exercise 
of more care under such circumstances than is required 
on a bright, clear, dry day. Likewise, there is nothing 
in the factors of darkness, wetness, rain or mist, which 
rnakes headlights become less visible to a bicyclist. If 
anything, these factors make the headlights more promi-
nent because the reflection from the headlights is multi-
plied a thousandfold as the rays of light strike droplets 
of water in the air and the wet planes and surfaces of 
the street ahead of the taxicab. Further, in a drizzle 
such as was present on this occasion the sound of the 
vehicle is .much more apparent to an average person 
because of the noise of the tires upon the wet pavement 
than is the case when dry tires move upon dry pave-
ment. 
If there was ever a case where it can be said with 
legal certainty that an accident occurred because of the 
fault of one of the participants, this is that case. Nothing 
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in the majority decision of the Court discloses how rea-
sonable men could possibly differ on the question of 
decedent's negligence. A jury of such men might disagree 
in that some of its members might find decedent negli-
gent because he entered the intersection 'Without looking. 
Others might find that he looked but failed to heed what 
he saw. Still others might find that he ran through 
the stop sign, or that he entered a through street at a 
time when another vehicle was approaching so close as to 
constitute a hazard. Still others might find he was stand-
ing in the iniddle of the street with the bicycle with no 
lamp upon it on a dark and rainy morning, and finally, 
others might find that he did one or two or three, or all 
of these things. But, whatever such a jury found, 
whether it be one or more, or all, o.f these things in 
combination, we cannot see how any jury could find 
that none of these factors, either singly or in combina-
tion, failed to have a contributing effect upon this acci-
dent. Such a contention reduces the law to an absurdity 
and renders meaningless the statutes concerning lights 
upon vehicles and rights of way at through-highway 
intersections, and destroys the effect of the statutes and 
decisions of this state which place the same burden of 
care upon a bicyclist as is placed upon a motorist. 
The decision of the Court apparently gives . little 
weight to the numerous specifications of negligence on 
the part of decedent, and disposes of all of them by 
stating that the jury "may have determined that 
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deceased acted as an ordinary prudent person in failing 
to appraise accurately the proximity of the cab, or its 
speed, so as reasonably to have misjudged his ability to 
clear the intersection in safety.'' Thus the Court states 
that a jury could absolve decedent from the charge of 
contributory negligence even if the jury found that Mr. 
Gibbs failed to stop for the stop sign, failed to look 
for on-coming traffic, or having looked, failed to heed 
what he saw, all such failures apparently being excused 
because of the possibility that Mr. Gibbs might have mis-
judged the situation in which he found himself. 
In so holding, however, the Court overlooks the 
question already discussed, namely, that the deceased 
had no light upon his bicycle. That is an element of 
negligence which cannot be excused on the ground of 
poor judgment. It is an element that is constant in the 
case and bears upon each and all of the other elements 
of negligence. It acted in concert with the other acts of 
negligence on the part of deceased. 
Logically it is of no avail to plaintiff to argue that 
there is no proof that Gibbs was riding the bicycle. 
While the Court apparently paid little heed to the argu-
ment respondent advanced upon the original hearing 
of this case to the effect that the inferences to be drawn 
from the physical facts pointed inescapably to the fact 
that decedent was riding the bicycle, there is still another 
fact not previously discussed which bears out this point. 
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If, as has been suggested by appellant, in a pure after-
thought, the decedent was standing in the street with 
his bicycle, or was walking with it, then there is no 
explanation for the sudden turn of the wheel of the 
bicycle to the left of decedent. The natural and logical 
thing for a person to do if he was walking or pushing 
a bicycle and suddenly became aware of a car bearing 
down upon him, would be to step back to safety, or to 
rush blindly ahead, but it would not be a natural reflex 
for him to turn the wheel of the ·bicycle, as apparently 
\\·as done in this case. This point is urged because it 
is important in the consideration of whether or not· 
decedent acted as an ordinary and prudent man, and 
whether or not he should be charged with the same 
degree of care as is a motorist under the laws of this 
state. 
Any attempt now to justify plaintiff's position upon 
the ground that decedent was not riding his bicycle 
is to refuse to give weight to the inferences which 
should be drawn from the facts and gives weight to 
inferences which can be based upon no fact at all. 
By its holding in this case the Court has said that 
even in the face of all of these acts of negligence there 
still must be submitted to a jury the question ·of whether 
or not the negligent acts and omissions contributed to the 
cause of the accident. To say that a jury of reasonable 
men could examine this record, consider these facts 
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of negligence, draw the logical inferences from the facts, 
and in the light of ordinary experience find deceased 
not guilty of contributory negligence, is to defy reason 
and logic and to mock the experience of the ordinary 
individual who sits upon the jury. Such a decision allows 
and invites a jury to enter into "the realm of conjec-
ture,'' and there to speculate and search out reasons 
why conduct, which is ordinarily and almost without 
exception considered negligent, should not be said to be 
negligence sufficient to bar recovery in this case. 
POINT II. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS IN CONFUSION 
AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INTER-
SECTION LAW OF THIS STATE, AND THE DECISION, 
THEREFORE, SHOULD BE RECALLED AND THE CASE 
REHEARD. 
A source of particular disturbance to Counsel is 
that portion of the majority decision of the Court wherein 
it is confessed that the law of intersection cases is so con-
fused that no longer can reliance be placed upon the 
earlier decisions of the Court. It is stated that since 
no two cases "possibly could present analogous facts," 
henceforth the Court must analyze each case upon its own 
facts, without regard to precedents. 
It is submitted that such a course of action flies in 
the teeth of the doctrine of stare decisis, upon which 
much of the structure of Anglo-Saxon law has been based. 
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The stability of the law has been guarantee~ by this 
doctrine. The laws by which our people are governed 
have thereby becon1e fixed, definite and certain, and we 
have been able, in the conduct of our affairs, to rely upon 
the law as established, until such tiine as a court of 
competent jurisdiction, in the exercise of its wisdom, 
has determined that the over-all welfare of mankind 
required a change in the law. 
By its decision in this case, however, the Court has 
not determined that intersection law should be changed, 
but has apparently found that the law has become too 
difficult to apply to the shifting factual situations pre-
sented for determination. It is proposed that the cardinal 
principle of adherence to judicial precedent be abandoned, 
and that each case be decided without attempting to fit 
the decision into the judicial edifice constructed by our 
courts over the years. The cases shall be decided, says 
the Court, without any attempt to "reconcile the same 
by apology for, explanation of, or nice distinction 
between" earlier decisions. If, as stated ·by the Court, 
''disharmony'' exists in the decisions, it is difficult to 
see how the proposed plan of action will restore harmony 
to the scene, because each case will announce its own 
principle, and become its own precedent. 
Under this decision, neither the Bench nor the Bar 
of this state will be able to determine the rights of 
principals in an intersection case, since such rights will 
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necessarily depend upon the ultimate analysis of each 
case by this Court. As the opinion of the Court indicates, 
''minds differ'' and there are ''characteristic differences 
in point of view.'' As the personnel of the Court shifts 
and changes in the passage of time, the effect of this 
decision will be to cause the determination of legal rights 
to depend, not upon the structure of the law, but upon the 
composition of the Court-upon the "differences in 
point of view'' of the Justices (or Judges) who sit in 
judgment upon each individual case. 
During the course of preparation of this Petition 
and Brief, Counsel has received numerous inquires from 
other members of the Bar, who ask if, under the facts 
of this case, the decision of the Court should be inter-
preted as overruling these leading intersection cases 
which have heretofore guided the Bench and Bar in the 
daily practice of their profession: Bullock v. Luke, 98 
Utah 501, 98 Pacific (2d) 350; Hickok v. Skintner, 113 
Utah 1, 190 Pacific (2d) 514; Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 
276, 193 Pacific (2d) 437; Gren v. Norton, ________________ Utah 
----------------, 213 Pacific ( 2d) 356. 
As we understand these inquiries, members of the 
Bar are confused because the Court, while not expressly 
repudiating the cited cases, has indicated that their 
effect is to be minimized, and that, in the future, each 
case will be decided by the Court on the basis of its own 
facts, without regard to the question of whether or not 
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the conduct of the litigant~ confonned to the standards 
previously laid down as law. 
To illustrate the problem, this question has been 
posed: if an aeeident occurs involving two vehicles which 
collide upon an intersection not protected by traffic 
control::', with clear visibility available to each driver 
for a considerable distance, are the parties to be held 
to the principle of BuUock v. Luke, supra, or will be the 
case be examined upon its facts, and a jury allowed to 
speculate as to whether or not one or the other of the 
drivers Ina de a ''mistake in judgment'' or in some other 
way is to be excused from the consequences of his con-
duct~ We confess our inability to answer such a problem 
upon the basis of the decision in the instant case, and 
we respectfully request that the Court furnish its guid-
ance to members of the Bench and Bar upon this subject. 
The Court notes, in its decision, that the ''fallibility 
of humanity" may provoke error and injustice as each 
case is analyzed. It is submitted that this statement 
furnishes one of the strongest possible arguments against 
the policy of disregarding precedent. To stand by pre-
cedent is to guard against human fallibility. There can 
be no stability in the law if it is to be decided, not by 
the Court, "·hich is a perpetual instrument of justice, 
but by the differing minds of the Justices who may, from 
time to tirne, cmnprise the Court. As is stated in 14 
American Jurisprudence, Courts, Sec. 61, p. 285, "par-
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ties should not be encouraged to ... speculate on a 
fluctuation of the law with every change in the ex-
pounders of it.'' 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent sincerely urges that, on the basis of 
the foregoing argument, and in view of the importance 
of the questions inherent in this case, the Court should 
grant a rehearing and reargument and that the Court 
should thereupon review the entire matter, and upon 
such review, it is our sincere conviction that the Court 
will feel compelled to find that the trial court was not 
arbitrary in its decision and that its decision should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW 
JOHN H. SNOW 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
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